CoffeeLoader Malware Returns Through Retadup USB Worm
CoffeeLoader malware, a malicious program designed to deliver additional payloads to infected Windows machines, is being distributed through a revived version of the Retadup worm. Kaspersky disclosed the activity and said it blocked around 15,000 systems from infection, with most of the affected systems located in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia.
Retadup was disrupted by French law enforcement authorities in August 2019. The Windows worm spreads through infected USB drives and has previously been used to deliver cryptocurrency miners, Stop ransomware and the Arkei password stealer. Kaspersky said that, two years ago, someone began re-registering domain names that Retadup had used as command-and-control servers, the systems used by malware operators to send instructions. Those servers first distributed SmokeLoader packed with the 32-bit version of Armoury, a tool that hides malicious code. In early 2025, the same servers began serving CoffeeLoader.
It remains unclear whether the original worm author or another threat actor brought the Retadup command-and-control servers back online. CoffeeLoader was first documented by Zscaler ThreatLabz in March 2025. That analysis described the malware using the Armoury packer to resist analysis and eventually run Rhadamanthys shellcode, which is computer code used to carry out malicious instructions. CoffeeLoader is also assessed to share source-code similarities with the SmokeLoader loader family.
Kaspersky said the observed installer is based on NSIS, a system for creating Windows installers. When launched, it places a file called 7z.dll in a temporary folder and runs it through rundll32.exe, a legitimate Windows program that can load code from a DLL, or dynamic-link library. The 7z.dll file is a modified version of a library from the 7-Zip archiver. Part of the original code has been replaced with self-decrypting shellcode that forms a new version of the Armoury packer.
Earlier Armoury-packed malware used filenames such as ArmouryAIOSDK.dll and ArmouryA.dll and took over part of the original Armoury Crate functionality with self-decrypting shellcode. That shellcode extracted code which used the OpenCL library to make the computer's graphics processor, or GPU, perform a decryption routine. The objective was to install CoffeeLoader, make it start again after a reboot, and inject it into a newly created dllhost.exe process. Process injection means placing malicious code inside another running program.
The newer packer still uses the GPU, but replaces OpenCL with OpenGL, another graphics library. It also delivers intermediate shellcode rather than a DLL. That intermediate code acts as a downloader, retrieving the main CoffeeLoader malware. To establish persistence, meaning the ability to remain active after the computer restarts, the Trojan copies 7z.dll into subfolders of %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA%. It uses the Windows Run registry key for automatic startup. The subfolder, library and registry value each receive a name made from eight hexadecimal digits generated from system volume information.
The downloader also creates a registry key that prevents the user from disabling automatic startup through Task Manager. After persistence is established, the malware starts a legitimate Windows process, such as dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe or AtBroker.exe, and injects itself into that process. It then downloads shellcode from a hard-coded command-and-control server. The shellcode decrypts and runs CoffeeLoader, which can receive the next-stage malware in three ways: inject it into a process, save it as an executable and run it, or save it as a DLL and run it through rundll32.exe.
For organisations managing Windows systems, AEU-I offers security-first IT, infrastructure and consulting, which is relevant when assessing the risks from infected removable drives and malware persistence. Users should avoid connecting unknown USB drives, scan removable media with their security software before opening files, ask an IT administrator to review unexpected startup entries, and report unusual Windows processes or repeated security warnings instead of dismissing them.