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Linux Cryptomining Malware SANSAR Hides GPU Activity

Linux Cryptomining Malware SANSAR Hides GPU Activity

Linux cryptomining malware tracked as SANSAR is being used to mine cryptocurrency while making GPU activity appear normal. Elastic Security Labs attributed the operation to a financially motivated threat activity cluster tracked as REF3364, with activity observed in late October 2026.

SANSAR is a Rust-based orchestrator, meaning a program that coordinates other tools. It receives commands through the TOR anonymity network and manages both CPU and GPU miners. Elastic said the operation also deploys a kernel rootkit, software that runs with deep operating system privileges to conceal activity, an NVIDIA Management Library (NVML) wrapper that falsifies GPU readings, and a separate backdoor called netns.

The initial access described by Elastic involved an exposed Ray job agent. Ray is a system that can submit and run computing jobs. The attacker used it to execute commands, including jobs that ran the NVIDIA System Management Interface, or nvidia-smi, to collect the host's GPU inventory and send it to an external server. The attacker then submitted a Python reverse shell job, which created a connection back to a remote listener, and added an SSH key to the account's authorized_keys file for persistent access.

After gaining root access, the attacker placed the toolkit in /opt/vadi_, built the acpi_thermal_mgr kernel module through Dynamic Kernel Module Support (DKMS), and added an initramfs loader. An initramfs is a temporary root file system loaded into memory during early startup, before Linux switches to its normal file system. The module and loader are stored in the boot image on disk, allowing the rootkit to load again when the host starts with that image.

The modified NVML wrapper is central to the concealment. It filters process information and intercepts the NVML calls used by monitoring tools such as nvidia-smi. Instead of showing the real workload, it reports GPU utilization as 0%. It also replaces temperature readings with random values from 36 to 46 degrees Celsius, or 96.8 to 114.8 degrees Fahrenheit, and substitutes power readings between 100 and 200 watts. That can make a heavily used GPU look less suspicious to routine monitoring.

The delivered files include sansar, which handles TOR command-and-control communication, starts and stops miners, updates their configuration, manages connections, opens interactive shells, launches an IPv4 TCP SYN traffic task against a chosen address and port, and maintains the NVML hooks. The CPU branch selects kurt, identified as XMRig version 6.25.0, while the GPU branch selects tilki, identified as SRBMiner-MULTI version 3.6.9. The package also includes lyrebird, a legitimate pluggable transport proxy for TOR, the acpi_thermal_mgr.ko Linux rootkit, and netns, an Ethereum-assisted backdoor.

When SANSAR starts, it checks TracerPid, the process identifier of a program currently tracing or debugging it. If the value is not zero, SANSAR exits. It then connects through Arti, a TOR implementation, to the onion service efxisnqldelyr5ra25oqfrsut54b34g26e7zrsiuupsoekjof2gho2id.onion. Through that connection it receives commands, gathers host and GPU information, checks miner status and launches the CPU or GPU miner selected by the command-and-control response.

The acpi_thermal_mgr.ko rootkit uses Function Tracer, or ftrace, a Linux mechanism for observing and intercepting functions, to hide processes, files and socket entries. It intercepts system calls used for directory listings, file access and process termination signals. Matching records are removed or requests involving concealed processes and files are blocked, with the system returning “No such file or directory” or “No such process.”

The netns backdoor runs as a systemd service. It obtains a controller IPv4 address by querying the Ethereum smart contract at 0x43eb291f56688c63c93e8a93c4591fc997cf6349, then makes a plain TCP connection to that address on port 8080. The connection opens a reverse shell to the host and port specified in the command-and-control response. Elastic said the operator has not been identified, although Turkish-language comments were found in the rootkit's source code.

The operation matters especially for organisations using GPUs for artificial intelligence and large language model workloads. Hidden mining can consume computing capacity intended for legitimate jobs and increase operating costs, while falsified readings can make the abnormal use harder to spot. Teams should review who is allowed to submit Ray jobs, inspect SSH access and verify that GPU monitoring libraries have not been modified. AEU-I provides security-first IT, infrastructure and consulting for teams reviewing the security of this kind of environment.

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