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Optimizely attack put card skimmers on 178 sites

Optimizely attack put card skimmers on 178 sites

The Optimizely attack put card skimmers on websites used by at least 178 organizations, including CNN, the BBC and Zoom. An attacker exploited a flaw in Optimizely Web Experimentation and inserted malicious JavaScript, code that runs inside a web page, into customer projects. Report URI, which monitors the scripts loaded by websites, found the code in 188 snippets belonging to 178 organizations after checking 1,611 Optimizely snippets. The actual number may be higher because the firm could only inspect snippets it found in time.

A snippet is the small piece of code that Optimizely customers load to run experiments on their pages. According to Optimizely documentation, the snippet updates when a customer changes a setting and runs custom code stored as Project JavaScript. Report URI said the attacker added a loader, a small program that fetches or starts other code, to that field while leaving the rest of each snippet unchanged. The snippets continued to come from cdn.optimizely.com with the vendor's certificate, so every page that loaded one also ran the malicious loader. Sites that served the snippet through their own domains were affected as well, because the content still came from the compromised project.

The loader appeared in three forms. Most versions directly requested 1688360[.]cc/track.js. Another hid the domain in base64, an encoding method that can conceal readable text from a simple search, while a third included a complete copy of the payload so it could still run if the domain was blocked. Cynet's endpoint detection identified browser connections to the attacker's server and traced the code to a file served from cdn.optimizely.com. Cynet researchers also captured it on CNN and Zoom pages, while noting that a website delivering the code was not necessarily compromised itself.

The first injection appeared at 04:21 UTC on Monday in the BBC's snippet. A mass cleanup began at about 20:40 UTC, and by 21:52 UTC only TalkTalk's snippet still contained the code. The initial injection loaded webshell[.]lol, which Report URI identified as the same actor's injector. That injector had also been placed in Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts since late the previous week, and first appeared on Turkish websites on September 17. Smartsheet's script was cleaned once and then infected again with a concealed version, suggesting the attacker still had access at that point.

The main payload, track.js, replaced cryptocurrency wallet addresses in page text, forms, links, the clipboard and outgoing requests. StepSecurity's analysis found that it changed only addresses with a valid checksum, a mathematical check used to detect typing errors, and located near words such as wallet, deposit or send. Copying an address did not make the payment safe because the copied value could already belong to the attacker. The code also captured card numbers, expiry dates and CVVs, the security codes used for card payments, when they were submitted through a site's own form fields. It could not read details entered into a payment provider's cross-origin iframe, an embedded payment window isolated from the surrounding site, such as Stripe hosted fields or Adyen fields.

After swapping an address near wallet or payment wording, the code sent the visitor's cookies, small pieces of browser-stored information used to maintain sessions, and a screenshot of the page to the attacker. Cookies marked HttpOnly, a setting that prevents page scripts from reading them, could not be accessed. Report URI said cryptocurrency had already been stolen. By 19:25 UTC on Monday, the attacker's wallets had received about $7,040, all within roughly nine hours. StepSecurity counted about $6,600 across the same addresses, but noted that two addresses were already active before the injections and the transaction chain could not show which transfers came from victims.

On iPhones and iPads, the loader requested boot.js from two .icu domains. That script checked the iOS version and opened a hidden iframe containing an exploit kit, a collection of code designed to abuse device vulnerabilities. Report URI identified the kits as Coruna and DarkSword, as documented by Google researchers. Coruna targets iOS 13.0 through 17.2.1, while DarkSword targets iOS 18.4 through 18.7. Coruna was used for iOS 13 to 17, DarkSword for iOS 18, and a separate chain on iOS 26 only collected device information. Between 17:13 and 17:57 UTC, every visit from iOS 18.6 or earlier also received a Coruna iframe, with pages reloading every 60 seconds to retry the exploit. The kit comments identify iOS 18.7.3 and later, and iOS 26.3 and later, as patched. Cynet retrieved the second stage through an emulated iPhone browser, but described it as conditional delivery rather than a successful takeover of a physical iPhone or iPad.

Optimizely said in an incident notice at 01:02 UTC that it had fixed the vulnerability, removed the malicious code, secured affected user accounts and added protections against unauthorized code delivery. The notice did not explain how the flaw worked, how many projects changed, when the fix was applied, whether the attacker retained access or what customers should do. Report URI recommends checking Project JavaScript and custom experiment code for 1688360, atob( or unrecognized scripts, reviewing users, API tokens and integrations able to write to the account, and rotating their credentials. Website owners should treat card details entered into their own forms on Monday as potentially exposed, as well as session tokens or secrets in cookies without HttpOnly. They should search logs back to 08:00 UTC on Monday, inspect every served snippet for 1688360, .icu and track.js, record each Last-Modified header, and ask Optimizely which project IDs changed and when.

A strict Content Security Policy, a browser rule restricting where scripts can run and where data can be sent, should use restrictive script-src and connect-src settings. Simply allowing cdn.optimizely.com would not help because the malicious content came from that host, and strict-dynamic or unsafe-eval allowed the payload to run on some sites. Site owners should keep third-party tags away from checkout pages and use payment provider fields in a cross-origin iframe. Report URI kept infected snippets with hashes and timestamps for affected organizations and CERTs, computer emergency response teams, on request. Cynet advises against broadly blocking cdn.optimizely.com or the affected news sites because the legitimate delivery host is not itself a reliable indicator.

For visitors, Apple devices should be updated to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later. Anyone who made a cryptocurrency payment on Monday should compare the destination with the intended address, and anyone who entered card details on an affected site should monitor statements and replace the card.

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