GitDoor malware hides commands in GitHub and SharePoint
GitDoor malware is being used alongside the previously undocumented GraphDoor backdoor in an active campaign targeting government sectors in Asia and Africa. Kaspersky calls the activity Operation ShadowCloud and said it identified the campaign in early 2026. The attackers abuse legitimate cloud services, including GitHub, Microsoft SharePoint and Ably, as command-and-control channels. Command and control, or C2, is the system an attacker uses to send instructions to compromised devices and receive their results.
Kaspersky said the threat actor uses the legitimate MeshAgent utility to deliver the two backdoors. MeshCentral Agent is a remote access tool that supports remote desktop control, command-line access and file management. The campaign has also targeted an unspecified Taiwanese organisation. How MeshAgent was installed remains unknown, although Kaspersky said signs suggest the attackers reused an earlier infection already present on the network.
The agent connects to a hard-coded server at “wss://27.102.66[.]162:443/agent.ashx” and downloads three items staged on the endpoint: a legitimate program used for DLL sideloading, a rogue loader DLL, and an encrypted file containing the main payload. DLL sideloading is a technique in which a malicious library is placed where a legitimate program will load it. The legitimate binaries identified include start.exe, pythonw.exe and zoomit.exe. The loader DLL names include jli.dll, SbieDll.dll, python39.dll, WINMM.dll and libcef.dll.
Kaspersky has identified at least two loader types. Type 1 first processes the encrypted data with the RC4 stream cipher and then applies an XOR mask. Type 2 uses only XOR. Both loaders decode the backdoor and inject it into the memory of the current process. The backdoors also use control flow flattening and nested helper functions, techniques intended to make analysis more difficult by obscuring the program’s genuine execution path.
GitDoor uses GitHub for C2 and separates incoming commands from stolen or generated results. It receives command payloads from “/repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/Havo” and uploads execution results to “/repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/Trix”. The Havo repository is public, while Trix is private. The repositories’ creation dates indicate that preparations may have begun by the end of 2024. GitDoor supports 26 commands covering file management, keystroke logging, proxy operation, including through Ably, and the loading of Base64-encoded Common Object File Format, or COFF, binaries into memory before the backdoor is terminated.
Its custom shellcode capability can download and run modules for APC process injection, Windows service enumeration and management, file and directory listing, file wiping and recursive directory deletion. The modules can display active TCP connections, change firewall rules, list and terminate processes, dump the memory of a process identified by its process ID into a file, and run commands through cmd.exe. They can also enumerate, create and run scheduled tasks, recursively inspect Windows Registry keys and values, change Registry values, and collect user, local group and group-member information.
The same capability can create a Windows user account or add a user to a global or local group. GitDoor can save keystrokes to “%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Cache\\logs.dat”, dump Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge cookies directly from process memory using CookieKatz, and use Mimikatz to dump credentials from Windows LSASS. It can capture the whole screen or a particular window identified by its process ID, extract WhatsApp’s database decryption key, initiate NTLM authentication to an attacker-controlled destination, and calculate system idle time by observing mouse and keyboard activity.
GraphDoor uses a different cloud route. It opens a named pipe, creates an “Intel_Log” directory inside the system’s Application Data folder and gathers system information for transmission to the attackers. It authenticates a malicious application through “login.microsoftonline.com” on port 443, uses the resulting access token to communicate with the Microsoft Graph API, and stages information on a SharePoint drive.
GraphDoor retrieves three plugin modules from the server and runs them in parallel for screenshot capture, process listing and keylogging. It then reconnects to SharePoint to obtain commands for execution. Its plugins include kl.ts for recording keystrokes to the same logs.dat path, pr.ts for listing running processes, scr.ts for taking JPEG screenshots of a window matching a supplied process ID, and moveDir.ts for moving the legitimate executable, loader DLL and encrypted backdoor file to selected paths. Other plugins, channel.ts and abchannel.ts, launch proxies, while ab2channel.ts provides a covert SOCKS5 proxy that tunnels TCP traffic through Ably’s Pusher-compatible WebSocket service. GraphDoor’s shellcode can also run commands through cmd.exe and execute MZ-format files.
The actor’s identity is unknown. Kaspersky said the campaign shares some overlap with activity that Sophos tracks as Bronze Sandcastle, and that it shows tactical similarities with earlier campaigns associated with FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle, also known as BlackTech. On several victim systems, those groups used the same staging directories as GitDoor, with their implants deployed within one day of GitDoor deployment. Kaspersky said this does not prove a direct link, but may indicate that a Chinese-speaking group is developing or using the backdoors.
The central security problem is that the traffic can resemble ordinary business activity. Calls to Microsoft Graph, GitHub and Ably may be difficult for network-based detections to distinguish from legitimate enterprise use. The same cloud repositories and messaging services also let the operators deliver plugins and shellcode on demand, adding functions or updating payloads without changing files already stored on the infected computer. Organisations should treat unexpected MeshAgent installations, unusual access to these services and unexplained remote administration activity as possible signs of compromise. For teams reviewing their wider security posture, AEU-I provides security-first IT, infrastructure and consulting.