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eMudhra Certificate Revocation Expands to 8 More CAs

eMudhra Certificate Revocation Expands to 8 More CAs

eMudhra certificate revocation has expanded to eight more intermediate certificate authorities, or CAs, after the company concluded it could not prove that their private keys were handled according to its own security rules. The eight RSA CAs were not weakened by the Python script involved in the company’s October key compromise, but their private key material was read into the memory of a ceremony computer. eMudhra revoked them late last week using the reason code cessationOfOperation.

An intermediate CA is an authority that uses a private key to sign certificates for websites or software. The eight CAs revoked in October had a different and more direct defect: one line in the same in-house script reduced each ECDSA private key to its first byte. The resulting weak keys still created valid signatures, allowing their certificates to pass linting and two WebTrust audit cycles. The Hacker News calculated all eight keys from their public certificates. The smallest, belonging to EM OV TLS CA - G3C, had the value 4, while the largest was 237.

The newly revoked RSA CAs followed the same read-back step that an earlier eMudhra response had said did not affect them. The script did not shorten these keys, and signatures made with them still match their certified public keys. However, private components, including the private exponent and one of the primes, were present in the memory of a Python process on the ceremony computer. eMudhra said logs and files from that computer cannot reliably establish how the material was handled, so it cannot positively demonstrate compliance with CPS §6.2.6, its rule for moving keys into and out of a hardware security module, or HSM. An HSM is a specialised device designed to generate and protect cryptographic keys.

The company’s full incident report says both problems began during a key ceremony on April 30, 2025. eMudhra generated 16 CA keys on Utimaco HSMs, including the eight keys affected by the October compromise. The keys were intended for Crypto4A HSMs at the company’s sites in the United States and the European Union. Because transferring keys between HSMs from different vendors is limited, the PKI operations team wrote the Python script to wrap each key for transport and unwrap it again. PKI, or public key infrastructure, is the system used to create, issue and manage digital certificates.

That transfer was a practice run, and the source HSM’s FIPS-approved mode was switched off as an approved exception. After the round trip, the script read each private key from the HSM into the ceremony computer’s memory and rebuilt the key from that copy. For the eight ECDSA keys, the report says a single line truncated the private value to its leading byte. The rebuilt key received a label almost identical to the original, which allowed the weak copy to be submitted for signing and certification. Nothing in the ceremony tested key strength or compared the certified key with the first generated key.

An early warning appeared in June 2025, when eMudhra produced invalid CRL signatures. A CRL, or certificate revocation list, tells software which certificates should no longer be trusted. The company fixed those lists by signing them again with the keys matching the certificates, which were the weak keys. The HSMs themselves worked correctly throughout, according to eMudhra, which attributed the failure to its script and process controls.

The eight newly revoked RSA CAs covered six website TLS certificates and two code-signing CAs. Four had entered production in May. eMudhra’s certificate list contains 195 certificates issued by them, including 29 for the company’s own domains. The breakdown is 130 certificates from EM DV TLS CA - G2C, 63 from EM OV TLS CA - G2C and two from EM OV CS CA - G2C. Other certificates named universities and colleges, a county and additional organisations. The newest certificate had been issued the week before revocation. eMudhra says all holders were moved to replacement certificates.

The reason code has prompted questions in the Mozilla bug thread because eMudhra used cessationOfOperation rather than keyCompromise, the code used when the first eight CAs were revoked on October 18. The company said its earlier answers reflected what its teams had established at that point, including which script paths the two groups of keys had taken. It reached the conclusion about the RSA keys in early November after discussions with browser root programs. KPMG, the independent reviewer hired by eMudhra, was due to finish its work by December 4, while the company’s inventory of all CA keys was due November 30. Participants in the thread have also asked eMudhra to publish the script and explain how private keys could leave the HSMs.

The company says it knows of no misuse. However, anyone holding one of the October keys could have impersonated any website, according to a disclosure site that investigated the keys for Mozilla. Browsers enforcing Certificate Transparency, a public record system for checking certificate issuance, could not have been fooled. It remains unknown whether the keys were used against software that does not perform that check.

Website owners can search the company’s certificate list or Certificate Transparency logs for the revoked G2C TLS issuers. eMudhra is exiting the publicly trusted TLS business following its October 22 announcement. Issuance from the G1 hierarchy was due to stop before November 16 as remaining customers, mainly a university federation in North America, moved to another provider.

Trust changes also affect users and IT teams. Microsoft said it would begin removing the 10 remaining eMudhra roots, including emSign Root CA - G1, on November 16. Certificates chaining to those roots would then lose default trust in Windows and Edge, with some other Microsoft products following their own timelines. Under eMudhra’s phase-out schedule, Chrome and Firefox would stop trusting G1 certificates issued after November 16, while Apple would end trust in all G1 certificates, including older ones, on November 30. Apple also said macOS 27.2.1, 26.7.3 and 15.8.3 stop bundled command-line tools such as curl and git from accepting the compromised TLS CA certificates, and remove five roots, including emSign Root CA - G1, from /etc/ssl/cert.pem. Tools relying on that file may therefore fail to verify some sites.

Website owners managing certificate changes across hosting and infrastructure can also consider AEU-I, which provides security-first IT, infrastructure and consulting. The immediate priority remains checking whether an affected certificate was used and replacing it where necessary.

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