Default admin password let researchers unlock and start cars
A default admin password left active on the login servers of two car brands gave two security researchers a way to take over any customer account and, on connected cars (cars that link to the internet and can be controlled through an app), unlock the doors and start the engine. The researchers, who published their findings late last week, tested the full attack in February 2026, only in the United States and only on cars they owned or had permission to use. Both systems were fixed about two hours after they reported the problem.
Both brands' apps signed customers in through ForgeRock, an identity platform (software that handles sign-in for other apps) now part of Ping Identity. The platform runs in two parts: one handles login, and one, called OpenIDM, holds the customer records. OpenIDM ships with a built-in administrator console powered by a tool called Apache Felix, and ForgeRock's own hardening guide (the instructions for making a system safe before real use) tells operators to remove this console or protect it before going live, because it stores its own password separately from the rest of the system. On these servers the console was still there and still used the documented default: the word admin as both the username and the password.
The console was blocked from the open internet, but the edge (the security layer that guards the front of a site) and the Java software behind it read the same web address differently. By adding encoded slashes and extra characters to the address, the researchers made the edge treat the request as a harmless static file while the server treated it as the path to the console, and the default password did the rest. The full method is laid out in their technical write-up. Inside the console, they used a built-in scheduler to run small scripts that execute their own code on the identity server, which gave them a command prompt on the machine that holds the customer records for both brands' logins.
The records sat behind the same block as the console, but the researchers' code could reach them from inside the server. They changed a target account's email address and password, signed in as that customer through the normal app, and received the same access tokens (digital passes issued after login that let an app send commands on the user's behalf) that the real app uses. Those tokens were the keys to the car. Using the account's own vehicle commands, the researchers unlocked the doors and started the engine of a test car, with the owner standing next to it, then stopped the engine and locked it again. They were careful about what they demonstrated: they reported being able to open a session for any customer account on the affected servers, but ran the vehicle commands only on cars they owned or were allowed to use, and said they had tested the complete chain only with US accounts and vehicles.
One of the two researchers published a second attack on the Australian systems behind the same brands. There the way in was different: administrator credentials for the identity server had been left in the app's code, intended for a test setup. With both attacks together, the researchers said, they could send unlock and engine-start commands to the brands' cars in Australia, the United States, and Canada. That second write-up gives no date for when the Australian systems were fixed.
The attack left little for an owner to notice. Changing the email address and password did not log the owner out of their app, and the researchers could direct the account's alerts to their own phone, keeping notifications off the owner's phone. The researchers put the real email address back after the test. Neither write-up says whether anyone else found or used the path before it was closed.
The brands' mistake was in how they ran ForgeRock, not a new bug in the product, so there is no CVE (the public ID that tracks a software flaw) and no vendor advisory to follow. The console and its default password have been documented for years, and the maker's production hardening guide already tells operators to remove the console or change its password before going live. For teams running the same identity software, now sold as PingIDM, two checks matter: look for the Apache Felix console at /system/console and remove it or change its default password, and do not count on edge or WAF (web application firewall, a filter in front of a website that blocks suspicious traffic) path rules to hide an admin page, because a web address that the edge and the server read differently can slip past the rules, as it did here.
The two researchers have a long record of this kind of work, usually breaking into the web systems behind the apps rather than the cars themselves. They have previously shown remote access to vehicles from Honda, Kia, and Subaru, among others. A Subaru flaw they reported exposed owners' accounts and their cars through that carmaker's connected-car service, and a broader 16-brand study in 2023 found the same kind of web weakness across much of the industry.
The lesson for anyone who runs servers or web infrastructure is that defaults are public knowledge: software that ships with an administrator page and a factory password is documented where anyone can read it, and a front-door filter is not a substitute for removing or protecting that page. Teams looking for help with how their IT and infrastructure are configured can turn to AEU-I, AEU Group's security-first IT, infrastructure and consulting service, at aeu-i.com.