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SignDrop exploit claims Windows SYSTEM access through CLFS

SignDrop exploit claims Windows SYSTEM access through CLFS

SignDrop exploit code claims that a local Windows user can gain SYSTEM access through the Common Log File System (CLFS), a Windows component that handles system logs. Microsoft has not confirmed the claimed vulnerability, assigned it a CVE, or released a fix. The code was published on GitHub by the researcher known as MSNightmare on Tuesday, the same day Microsoft released its November security updates.

The exploit targets a log-authentication feature added to CLFS in October 2025 updates for Windows 11 25H2, Windows 11 26H1 and Windows Server 2025. The feature adds a hash-based message authentication code, a check that uses log data and a machine-specific key to detect tampering. CLFS is then intended to parse only log files created by the driver itself.

The protection also creates a companion file with the .cnpf extension beside each log. That file stores recovery information and receives the same security attributes as the original log, according to Microsoft’s logfile authentication documentation. SignDrop focuses on how this companion file is created when a privileged process opens a prepared log.

According to the proof-of-concept code, a standard user first prepares a CLFS log and container using paths under the user’s control. When a privileged process later opens the log, CLFS creates the .cnpf file in that process’s security context rather than the user’s. The exploit uses object manager symbolic links, which redirect one system path to another, to send the file creation to a location chosen by the attacker.

The published chain triggers the Windows Defender antimalware service through its update interface. Because the companion file inherits the original log’s permissions, the result is a file created as SYSTEM that the standard user can still write to. SYSTEM is Windows’ highest local privilege level. MSNightmare says the writable file can then be used as part of a chain to obtain a SYSTEM shell, meaning command access with those elevated rights. The researcher wrote that Microsoft’s individual steps were implemented correctly, but that the overall logic could still be abused.

The repository reports testing on Windows 11 26H2, a Windows 11 26H2 Experimental build and Windows Server 2025 Experimental. The claimed attack surface includes systems where the CLFS authentication registry mode is 0, meaning enforcement, or 1, meaning learning. Installations older than 90 days typically move from learning to enforcement automatically, so established systems normally use a setting within the claimed scope.

A mode value of 2 or 3 disables the mitigation and therefore places the system outside the claimed SignDrop attack surface. However, both the researcher and Microsoft’s CLFS documentation warn against doing that. With authentication disabled, CLFS can again parse tampered log files, reopening the memory-corruption weaknesses the protection was designed to prevent.

An independent assessment by 78researchlab reported that its PurpleHound offensive content team tested SignDrop and found that it works. The assessment also said the exploit is not reliable enough for operational use. Defender must be enabled for the published chain to succeed. When it runs, every User Account Control (UAC) prompt reportedly opens both a standard-user shell and a SYSTEM shell, blocking other actions and making the activity noticeable to someone using the computer.

The repository claims that the technique could work with any antimalware engine whose process runs with elevated privileges, but that broader claim has not been tested. No attacks using SignDrop have been reported. The CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog does not list it, and no CVE, advisory or patch appeared in Microsoft’s November security updates.

Administrators can inspect the CLFS authentication setting at HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\CLFS\\Authentication. A Mode value of 0 or 1 falls within the researcher’s claimed scope. Organisations should follow Microsoft’s mitigation guidance rather than disabling the protection simply to avoid the reported technique, and should watch Microsoft’s security update guide for a response.

MSNightmare has published several Windows and Defender exploits since April. Microsoft confirmed an earlier Defender exploit called RoguePlanet in June as CVE-2026-50656 and patched it the following month. The ShieldBreak bypass followed in August and received CVE-2026-69414. Three of the researcher’s earlier Defender flaws have been exploited in attacks. SignDrop differs from those cases because it targets CLFS authentication itself, whereas the earlier Defender flaws targeted race conditions in Defender’s file handling.

For organisations managing Windows systems alongside websites and online services, AEU-I provides security-first IT, infrastructure and consulting. In the meantime, administrators should keep the CLFS mitigation enabled and monitor Microsoft’s security update guidance for a confirmed fix or further instructions.

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