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ScreenConnect Malware Targets Technician Sessions for MSP Spread

ScreenConnect Malware Targets Technician Sessions for MSP Spread

ScreenConnect malware is being used in an ongoing campaign that can turn one compromised managed endpoint into a route toward a technician’s workstation and other customer environments. Blackpoint Cyber’s Adversary Pursuit Group (APG), which shared its findings with The Hacker News, said the recovered toolkit exploits CVE-2026-84869, a now-patched critical ScreenConnect flaw with a CVSS score of 9.9.

CVE-2026-84869 is an improper privilege management and missing authorization vulnerability. It could allow an attacker to transfer files and execute them through an active remote session without authorization or confirmation from the host. Blackpoint Cyber said testing against a fully patched ScreenConnect client stopped the exploit payload. Patching therefore blocks the known vulnerability, but it does not remove the danger of an attacker who has already taken control of a legitimate operator session.

The malware, called SCKit, includes a capability named RelayTrap. It attempts to reverse-pivot, meaning it uses a trusted connection in the opposite direction, from a managed endpoint to the workstation of a technician investigating suspicious activity. The attack uses ScreenConnect’s built-in Run Command feature. It first checks for an existing ScreenConnect installation, then downloads and runs an attacker-controlled MSI installer called sc.msi. That installer delivers a batch script dropper, sckit-run.bat.

The batch script contacts ns.mo7sen[.]dev to download a PowerShell decoder, sckit-decoder.ps1. It then deploys other SCKit components, including SilentForceInstall-WithUninstall.ps1. That script installs two unauthorized ScreenConnect Access clients to maintain remote access. Other scripts and C# code interfere with existing ScreenConnect Guest sessions and provide the RelayTrap function.

RelayTrap attempts to replace the legitimate ScreenConnect Guest and use the technician’s connection to send the SCKit payload back for execution. The technique is associated with CVE-2026-84869, but the broader risk does not require a new software flaw once an attacker has a valid session. If the operation succeeds, SCKit searches browser data and process memory on the technician’s machine for an authenticated ScreenConnect browser session, including .ASPXAUTH cookies. Those session credentials can let attackers use the technician’s existing management permissions without obtaining separate passwords.

That access matters because technicians commonly connect to endpoints belonging to multiple customers, often from workstations that contain administrative tools and active management sessions. Commands sent through existing ScreenConnect agents could install additional software under the NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM account, a highly privileged Windows operating context. The unauthorized Access clients provide persistent control, while RelayTrap attempts to make the technician’s next support connection a way to expand the intrusion.

Blackpoint Cyber said the toolkit appears designed to target technicians rather than remain on the original endpoint. However, as of the report, there was no evidence that SCKit had successfully propagated to a technician workstation or bypassed the vendor’s patch for CVE-2026-84869. The findings still support reviewing the wider management relationship, including rogue Access installations, administrative command history, technician workstations and browser sessions after a technician has connected to a suspected system.

The investigation also raised a separate issue involving RMM+, one of five third-party ScreenConnect extensions ConnectWise blocked in partner environments. Huntress identified a serious authentication flaw in RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32. RMM+ allows another tool to manage ScreenConnect sessions without using the technician’s console and authenticates requests with a shared access key named RMMPlus.AccessKey.

In those versions, the access key defaults to a blank value when an administrator has not configured one. Because RMM+ operates separately from ScreenConnect’s normal accounts, roles and authentication controls, an attacker could potentially run commands without going through those controls or bypassing multi-factor authentication. Huntress said commands reached endpoints across several ScreenConnect instances within minutes, with no matching login activity, and appeared in logs linked to RMM+.

ConnectWise disabled five third-party extensions as a precaution and advised on-premises partners to disable them immediately. Blackpoint Cyber said it found no technical link between those extensions and SCKit. ConnectWise said malicious activity affected a limited number of ScreenConnect partners and that the initial access method remained unconfirmed, although its initial assessment suggested possible abuse of independent third-party extensions. The presence of an extension alone does not establish compromise.

There is also no evidence that an unpatched ScreenConnect client was the initial entry point. Blackpoint Cyber said initial access appears linked to malicious ScreenConnect extensions, but not enough evidence exists to confirm that conclusion. Identifying the first compromised system would require additional forensic evidence. November 11 was the earliest publicly reported activity, but earlier compromises cannot be ruled out.

CVE-2026-84869 had already been exploited in attacks that used ScreenConnect to distribute a four-stage Visual Basic Script payload to newly connected systems and eventually deliver an XMRig cryptocurrency miner. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency added the vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on September 11, 2026, requiring federal agencies to apply the fixes by September 14, 2026.

For businesses and managed service providers, the practical lesson is to patch ScreenConnect clients, remove or disable unapproved extensions, and protect operator sessions as carefully as the endpoints they manage. Additional authentication for bulk administrative actions and tighter session validation can reduce the consequences of a stolen session. AEU-I provides security-first IT, infrastructure and consulting for organisations reviewing this kind of risk.

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