Residential proxies made White House IP addresses rentable
Residential proxies, services that route a customer’s internet traffic through somebody else’s device and connection, reportedly made White House internet addresses available for public rental. Security researchers said several staff computers or mobile devices were running proxy software, causing traffic from paying customers to appear as though it came from the White House network.
Layer3 Intel detected multiple proxy nodes communicating from the network reserved for the Executive Office of the President. A node is a device participating in a network, while an Internet Protocol address, usually shortened to IP address, is the numeric address that identifies a device or connection online. The affected network is Autonomous System 2650 (AS2650), a numbered collection of internet addresses managed together. Layer3 Intel described the activity as relatively persistent from October 5 through November 3, 2026, recording 236 occasions when proxies exited through AS2650.
The researchers said the residential proxy activity involved six IP addresses and appeared on 26 of the 30 days they examined. Most of it occurred between 5 p.m. and midnight. Layer3 Intel also reported that 28 separate residential proxy services could send traffic through the network. The team said it encountered the addresses by chance while purchasing ordinary global, rotating access from public proxy providers, rather than deliberately selecting the White House network. According to the researchers, anyone could obtain such access by registering with one of the services and paying a small fee.
Synthient, which tracks proxy activity, attributed traffic from AS2650 to multiple Windows 11 installations of Infatica. Infatica is a residential proxy service that can be incorporated into free mobile and desktop applications. Its founder also founded King Servers, a Russian hosting business that hosted six of the eight IP addresses used by Russian state security services to compromise election-system databases in Arizona and Illinois in 2016. The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment about the proxy findings.
Residential proxy providers vary in legitimacy, and many are based in China or Russia. Their common function is to let customers conceal their own IP address or make their traffic appear to come from another location. A website receiving a request sees the rented address, not the proxy customer’s actual connection. In this case, a website could therefore see traffic as originating from the dedicated White House network even though the person sending it was elsewhere.
These services are associated with significant volumes of unwanted and malicious activity. Reported uses include account takeover, in which someone gains control of another person’s online account, as well as other cybercrime, advertising fraud and large-scale collection of online content for artificial intelligence projects. Their presence on a sensitive network also creates risks beyond disguising where web traffic originates.
In late 2025, cybercriminals were found to be exploiting a widespread vulnerability in residential proxy services. The flaw let attackers use each proxy endpoint, meaning the device providing the rented connection, to inspect its local network for vulnerable systems and infect them with malware, software designed to damage, spy on or take control of devices. In January 2026, dozens of proxy services had to patch their networks after Synthient demonstrated that criminals were abusing a vulnerability to seize control of devices inside unsuspecting users’ local networks.
Synthient said some resellers offer bandwidth for as little as 60 cents per gigabyte, putting access to confidential and trusted networks within reach for less than a dollar. It also warned that the reseller ecosystem can allow criminals to purchase access without completing Know Your Customer (KYC) checks, which are identity-verification procedures used to establish who a customer is.
A frequent route onto workplace networks is software installed on an employee’s device. Application developers can add software development kits (SDKs), ready-made components supplied by proxy networks, to their programs. The developer receives a small payment for each installation, while the user’s device and internet connection can become part of the provider’s proxy inventory. This means an apparently free application can create an organisational security exposure that is not obvious to the person who installed it.
The problem extends well beyond one government network. During a January 2026 webinar, Spur reported finding residential proxies in nearly 300 government-owned and operated networks, 318 utility companies, 166 healthcare companies or hospitals, and 141 banking and finance companies. Infoblox reported earlier in 2026 that 65 percent of its customer base had made Domain Name System (DNS) requests for at least one domain associated with residential proxies. DNS is the system that converts website names into the internet addresses computers use.
Businesses should treat unexpected residential proxy activity as a device and network security issue, particularly where employees can install free software or connect personal devices. AEU-I offers security-first IT, infrastructure and consulting for organisations reviewing how they manage such exposure. The White House findings underline the central risk: once a device contributes its connection to a proxy network, outside customers may be able to make their activity appear to originate from an address belonging to that workplace.