← All articles

OpenSSH SSHole flaw exploited within hours of disclosure

OpenSSH SSHole flaw exploited within hours of disclosure

The OpenSSH SSHole flaw was targeted less than nine hours after its public disclosure, according to threat intelligence firm Previdian. OpenSSH is software used for encrypted remote logins through Secure Shell (SSH). Previdian recorded eight exploitation attempts and confirmed root access, the highest level of system control, on a honeypot running Alpine Linux and OpenSSH. A honeypot is a deliberately exposed system used to observe malicious activity.

The vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-123158 and has a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) severity score of 8.1. CVSS is a standard scale for expressing how serious a security flaw is. Nicknamed SSHole or *sshole, the issue affects Linux systems that use OpenSSH with the musl C library, a core software component that applications use to interact with the operating system, when Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) are disabled. PAM is a framework that lets Linux systems check login credentials through separate authentication modules. Alpine Linux's default OpenSSH server configuration is among the affected setups.

An unauthenticated attacker, meaning someone who has not signed in, can exploit the flaw by submitting an oversized password to an account deliberately configured without a usable password. The arbitrary password must be between 257 and 1,024 bytes long. A byte is a small unit of digital data. The attack does not require stolen passwords or SSH keys, but it only works when at least one account has an asterisk (*) stored as its password hash. A password hash is the transformed value a system stores instead of keeping a password in readable form. Accounts with valid password hashes cannot have their passwords bypassed through this vulnerability.

The underlying error can be traced to a patch introduced in 2016 for CVE-2016-6210, a vulnerability that allowed username enumeration, or testing whether particular account names existed. Under the affected conditions, OpenSSH attempts to hash the oversized password, but that operation fails and returns an asterisk. Linux also uses an asterisk in the account password field to represent a password disabled at system level. The sshd daemon, the background service that accepts SSH connections, compares the failed operation's asterisk with the asterisk stored for the account and incorrectly treats the matching values as successful authentication.

Successful exploitation gives an intruder whatever permissions the affected account already has. Safe Security said the consequences therefore depend on the account's privileges. Beyond unauthorized SSH access, an intruder could reach deployment credentials, application secrets or connected infrastructure available to that account. This could support lateral movement, meaning an attempt to move from one accessible system to others, or cause service disruption. The confirmed honeypot case resulted in root access, showing the severity when the exposed account already has extensive privileges.

Previdian said all eight attempts came from the IP address 89.116.89[.]18, which was geolocated to Japan. The source submitted oversized passwords and then ran the reconnaissance commands id, uname and hostname, which reveal basic information about the current account and system. The commands were issued through non-interactive SSH sessions, meaning they were sent directly without opening a conventional on-screen command session. Attribution beyond the observed address was not established.

The vulnerability does not affect Dropbear, Linux distributions based on glibc, non-Linux operating systems or installations that verify passwords through PAM. OpenSSH addressed the problem in version 10.6p2. Administrators should install OpenSSH 10.6p2 or the patched package supplied by their Linux distribution, then restart sshd so the corrected software takes effect.

Alpine Linux also recommends investigating log entries that say "Accepted password for" when they involve accounts that should not permit password logins. Administrators should inspect /var/log/messages for affected accounts such as alpine, root or users intended to accept SSH keys only. They should also review doas activity and recently created users, files and authorized keys. Alpine advises treating an exposed machine as compromised if an unauthorized login cannot be ruled out. For organisations reviewing exposed systems and their wider security posture, AEU-I provides security-first IT, infrastructure and consulting. Prompt patching remains essential because observed exploitation began within hours of disclosure.

Also available in: DeutschItalianoShqip