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Mobile exploits spread through hijacked analytics script

Mobile exploits spread through hijacked analytics script

Mobile exploits targeting iOS and Android users were delivered through compromised websites, deceptive domains and malicious code inserted into a widely loaded web analytics script. French cybersecurity company Sekoia attributes the large-scale campaign, which it named Poisoned Source, to the Russia-linked threat actor APT29 and says it discovered the activity in mid-October 2026. The attacks sought browser cookies and, depending on the device and exploit chain, Wi-Fi passwords or extensive mobile data.

The operation is a watering hole campaign, meaning attackers compromise websites likely to be visited by intended targets. Sekoia identified three routes: malicious JavaScript, code that runs inside a web browser, injected into legitimate sites; lookalike domains impersonating prominent websites in the US, Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, including america250[.]holiday; and a supply chain attack in which a trusted supplier was compromised to reach its customers. In the third route, attackers altered Plerdy SEO Tracker's a.plerdy[.]com/public/js/click/main.js file between August 27 and September 3, 2026.

Affected sites included a major chemical-industry trade association representing US companies, a far-right European political party and a Bulgarian military-related website. Sekoia also found the compromised analytics component spreading through sites associated with armies, special forces, ballistic equipment, unmanned aerial vehicles and other military equipment. The company said it remains uncertain whether the operators wanted particular visitors or intended to collect information broadly from any unpatched phone before selecting useful material.

Every route ultimately loaded JavaScript that inspected the visitor's browser and device attributes. The delivery system then selected a platform-specific N-day exploit, a previously disclosed software flaw for which fixes may already exist, based on the detected configuration. On iOS, the campaign used the DarkSword exploit kit. An exploit kit is a packaged collection of code for taking advantage of software flaws. Android visitors could receive malware designed to extract Chrome information and Wi-Fi passwords without persistence, meaning it did not arrange to remain installed after the immediate attack.

Sekoia divided the observed mobile exploits into three classes. Class A targeted iOS 16.7 using CVE-2025-43529 and CVE-2024-27834, delivering JavaScript malware that stole cookies. Class B targeted iOS 18.5 with a DarkSword chain comprising CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510 and CVE-2025-43520. That chain could collect SMS messages, iMessages, voicemail, contacts, call history, photos, Wi-Fi passwords and iCloud Keychain information. It also targeted WhatsApp and Telegram databases, Safari history and cookies, Apple Mail Envelope Index and Protected Index local databases, and data from Apple Health, Calendar, Notes and iCloud Drive. Local databases are structured files used by applications to store information locally.

Class C targeted Android devices using Chrome versions 139 through 145, while explicitly excluding version 143 for an unknown reason. It combined CVE-2026-3910 and CVE-2025-27038 to obtain remote code execution, which allows attacker-controlled instructions to run from elsewhere; sandbox escape, which breaks out of a browser's restricted area; and privilege escalation, which gains greater control over the device. The chain then delivered AndroSnitch to collect Chrome data and Wi-Fi passwords. It stopped if the phone identified itself as a Samsung Galaxy S25 Ultra with model identifier SM-S938B.

All three classes sent stolen information to ad.starx-net[.]com:8881/telemetry/v12. AndroSnitch resembles ANDROSNATCH, a Chrome cookie-stealing payload documented by Google in August 2024. That earlier tool was associated with a suspected APT29 watering hole targeting Android users who visited a Mongolian government website, using CVE-2024-5274 and CVE-2024-4671. Sekoia said the newer operation illustrates state-backed groups' continued reuse of mobile frameworks from Commercial Surveillance Vendors, or CSVs, and that packaged N-day chains reduce the cost and expertise needed for advanced mobile exploitation.

Related DarkSword and Coruna campaigns have also evolved. Weeks before the Poisoned Source findings, iVerify and Report URI described DarkSword P7 delivered through half-click attacks using advertising infrastructure. One path used a malicious Instagram advertisement themed around the World Cup and served from ad-track[.]live. Another campaign, called DeadTag, acquired expired domains formerly used by analytics or advertising tags that thousands of websites continued to load. Those domains could then send malicious JavaScript to iPhone visitors.

Report URI found that DeadTag withheld content from search engines, security scanners, automated browsers and other visitors that appeared to be bots. Its server chose where each human visitor would be redirected. Older iPhones running iOS 13 through 17.2.1 were directed to Coruna, while devices on iOS 18.4 through 18.7 received DarkSword P7. These were browser attacks rather than phishing pages or fake app downloads: on a vulnerable iPhone, merely opening the page could allow the exploit to escape the browser and install spyware without another tap, download or warning. More than 660 expired and re-registered domains were associated with DeadTag. Other routes led to decoy Google redirects, betting and casino registrations, search advertisements for car deals and dentists, fake surveys and fraudulent prize pages.

Zimperium zLabs counted 608 domains delivering Coruna-family code as of October 2026. Although Coruna was initially created by a nation-state actor for narrowly targeted operations, it became available to multiple threat actors after leaking following its initial disclosure. Some lure pages explicitly told visitors to leave an in-app or alternative iOS browser and reopen the link in Safari to activate the relevant exploit chain. Devices on iOS 17.2.1 or earlier received legacy Coruna code, including byte-identical JavaScript across recovered configurations, while later versions received a DarkSword-derived chain. Distribution included dating portals, AI-companion platforms, cryptocurrency promotions, media-streaming services and legitimate sites compromised with hidden iframes, which are invisible page sections that load outside content.

For organisations assessing risks from compromised web code and outdated devices, AEU-I provides security-first IT, infrastructure and consulting. The practical lesson for site owners is to review every third-party analytics and advertising component still loaded by their pages, especially tags linked to services or domains that are no longer actively maintained.

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