FastUnlock Windows Zero-Day Runs Apps From Locked PCs
FastUnlock is a newly disclosed Windows zero-day, meaning a security technique with no official fix available, that can let someone with physical access start programs on a locked computer without signing in. The person does not gain administrator control. Instead, testing reached a limited account that ThreatLocker identified as WSIAccount and described as not an administrator account.
The technique was posted yesterday by a researcher using the handles MSNightmare and Nightmare Eclipse. Endpoint-security firm ThreatLocker tested it the same day and confirmed that it worked in its test. Microsoft has not released a fix, and there is no indication that FastUnlock has been used in a real attack.
FastUnlock does not work on every Windows computer. It requires someone to hold the device, a Microsoft account that can be reached through recovery options on the lock screen, and Windows Narrator. Narrator is the operating system's built-in screen reader, which can be used to navigate the locked screen. ThreatLocker's independent test is the clearest available account of the method because the researcher's GitHub disclosure contains a short post and video but little written detail.
The main risk is physical access, not a remote attack over the internet. A person would need to reach the computer and meet the conditions that allow the lock-screen process to be used. Because no official list of affected Windows versions has been published, any machine that has both physical exposure and a reachable Microsoft account should be treated as potentially affected until Microsoft identifies the affected versions.
BitLocker, Microsoft's drive-encryption system, does not necessarily prevent this technique. Many Windows computers use a TPM, or Trusted Platform Module, a security chip that can release the drive's encryption key during startup. In a common configuration, the TPM unlocks the drive automatically without a PIN. By the time the Windows lock screen appears, the files on the drive may therefore already be readable to the running system, allowing the bypass to operate at that stage.
FastUnlock does not defeat BitLocker or recover its encryption key. It operates after the computer has already unlocked its own drive through the normal startup process. That makes it different from cracking an encrypted disk, but it remains a meaningful risk when someone else is holding a computer that is already running or sitting at the lock screen.
Until a Microsoft fix or advisory appears, the practical defences are physical control and stronger startup protection. Keep laptops, shared-desk computers and front-counter machines away from people who should not be able to handle them. On sensitive devices, add a startup PIN to BitLocker so the drive cannot unlock automatically. Shut down or hibernate a computer when it leaves the user's control, because a startup PIN protects a device that has not started, not one already sitting at the Windows lock screen. A locked screen by itself should not be treated as sufficient protection against a determined person with hands-on access.
Microsoft's countermeasures guidance recommends using a startup PIN and shutting down or hibernating computers when facing determined physical attackers. Watch for an official fix or advisory and apply it when available. For businesses reviewing the wider exposure, AEU-I provides security-first IT, infrastructure and consulting as part of that security planning.
The immediate priority is to identify devices that can be reached by unauthorised people, especially computers left running in shared or public areas. Those machines should be placed under closer physical control, protected with a startup PIN where appropriate, and shut down or hibernated whenever they are no longer in an authorised user's possession.