Check Point Security Gateway Attacks Wipe ESXi Files
Check Point Security Gateway vulnerabilities have been used in attacks that gave an unknown threat actor access to network appliances, installed a persistent backdoor and led to destructive activity on VMware ESXi hosts. Check Point said the first activity began on October 30, 2026, against Israeli organizations. A wider wave followed on November 2, targeting organizations in several countries and sectors.
The attackers first exploited PHP2Shell vulnerabilities through vulnerable Mobile Access portals. PHP2Shell is the name used for the initial-access flaws, tracked as CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. Check Point said activity from the address 130.94.19[.]204 targeted Israeli organizations in late October, approximately one week after a security fix became available. Evidence indicated that some compromises were successful.
After gaining access, the attackers moved from the portal service account to the root account, which has the highest level of control on a system. They did this by exploiting CVE-2026-123039 in Gaia OS, the operating system used by the affected appliances. The flaw is a missing authorization check in the DynamicCLI process. It has a CVSS score of 7.8, and allows an authenticated local user to run arbitrary commands by sending a single request to a socket. Because it is a local privilege escalation flaw, the attacker must already have code execution on the appliance. Check Point said it had observed active exploitation against a couple of dozen customers.
The affected versions are R82.20, R82.10, R82, R81.20, R81.10 and R81. The impacted products include Check Point Force Firewalls, Check Point Management and Log Servers, Multi-Domain Security Management and Multi-Domain Log Server, and Maestro Orchestrator. Following the privilege escalation, the attackers installed PHP web shells. A web shell is a malicious program placed on a web service that lets an intruder run commands and upload files remotely.
The web shells were used to establish continued access and deploy TSGA, a previously unreported passive backdoor. TSGA was installed as slot_CPconfigdaemon and includes TSProxy, a networking component. Check Point described the toolkit as capable of encrypted remote access, configuration theft, persistence through backups and snapshots, process injection and tampering with binary firewall logs. Process injection means placing malicious code inside another running program. TSProxy loads a library into selected appliance processes and intercepts networking functions, allowing specially marked attacker connections to pass while ordinary traffic continues. This provides concealed access through existing appliance services alongside the standalone backdoor.
The attackers also used the gogo scanner to identify internal assets and services. They then moved from a gateway to a VMware ESXi host over SSH, a method for remotely administering systems, using the vpxuser service account. On the ESXi host, they staged and executed destroy_v6, a Linux ELF wiper. A wiper is malware designed to destroy data rather than hold it for ransom. This one recursively searched the target directory, deleted files regardless of their extensions and attempted to overwrite them with zeros first. It also left a file named DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt in every processed directory. Some organizations hit during the first wave were among those later subjected to these destructive actions.
Check Point said the second wave had no clear geographic or sector preference. It included Israeli organizations previously targeted and organizations elsewhere, suggesting an opportunistic effort to obtain initial access. TSGA and TSProxy are assessed to be Check Point-specific parts of a toolkit called PhiliKit. ESET first documented PhiliKit in June 2026 and attributed it to the China-nexus cyber espionage group Armory Castle, formerly tracked as UNC5221.
Several details point toward a possible China-aligned actor, including the use of LightNode virtual private server infrastructure and scanning concentrated between 9 a.m. and 12 p.m. UTC, corresponding to typical Chinese working hours. However, Check Point said there is not enough evidence to link this campaign confidently to Armory Castle or another known China-nexus group. The use of a wiper, the focus on Israel and the political references in the destruction note leave multiple explanations open. Check Point said the actor may have conducted the whole operation, acted only as an initial-access broker, participated in a false-flag operation, or used the destructive activity as a distraction.
On November 13, 2026, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency added CVE-2026-123039 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. U.S. federal agencies were required to apply the patch by November 16, 2026. Organizations using affected Check Point products should ask their IT provider to confirm the applicable security fix, review Mobile Access portal activity and check whether unexpected web shells, accounts or SSH connections appear on gateways and ESXi systems. For teams needing broader security support, AEU-I provides security-first IT, infrastructure and consulting.