Sogou Input Method DNS hijack delivered DarkVigil backdoor
Sogou Input Method, a popular tool for typing Chinese on Windows, became a spyware delivery channel after attackers tampered with the way its web addresses were resolved, according to research from the Slovak security company ESET. The campaign, observed starting July 1, 2026, abused the Domain Name System (DNS), the internet's directory service that translates familiar names like sogou.com into the numeric addresses computers actually contact. By corrupting that translation for one specific Sogou lookup, a China-aligned group tracked as SlippyNunchucks redirected the app to servers it controlled and planted a backdoor, hidden software that gives an attacker remote access, named DarkVigil, also known by the alias FDMTP. ESET assesses that the operation targeted organizations and Chinese-speaking individuals in Hong Kong, Thailand, Japan, Vietnam, Oman and Sri Lanka.
SlippyNunchucks has been active since at least September 15, 2023, and is known for going after organizations and Chinese-speaking individuals across South and East Asia. Its signature tool is a modular .NET framework, a kit of components built on Microsoft's programming platform, that ships with DarkVigil and more than 20 plugins, add-on modules that widen what the implant can do. ESET reports that DarkVigil implants are typically deployed through popular Chinese applications, which has allowed the group to reach Chinese-speaking users across Asia and Europe. The applications abused include Sogou Input Method, QuickFox, QingTalk, MiYunChat, SoftCam and tawk.to. DarkVigil activity was previously linked to the better-known Mustang Panda group, but ESET says it found no tactical overlap between the two in its telemetry, the field data it gathers from customer sensors, and it now classifies SlippyNunchucks as a distinct intrusion set.
The move to Sogou was itself a reaction to a cleanup. Earlier in August 2026, Fortinet's FortiGuard Incident Response Team detailed how the same actors pulled off a supply chain compromise of QuickFox, a VPN and network acceleration tool, tampering with its distribution to deliver DarkVigil. Three days after QuickFox released a clean version of its program, ESET says, the adversary switched to Sogou Input Method, a popular Chinese-language input method editor (a program that turns keystrokes into Chinese characters) developed by Tencent. The attack hijacks the app's branded vocabulary promotion mechanism, the feature that pushes promoted brand-related vocabulary. In a clean environment, a legitimate Sogou component called SGtool.exe, which works as a multi-purpose task dispatcher, sends a plain HTTP request to the endpoint config.pinyin.sogou.com/api/brandScd/getBrandScd.php to fetch its configuration. In the attacks ESET discovered, the DNS answer for that domain was tampered with so it resolved to one of two staging servers: 47.239.250.102, registered as sogou-cdn.com, or 47.237.122.175, registered as dev.soft-png-cdn.com.
Those staging servers answered the app's request with a malicious configuration. It instructed the binary to download two additional payloads from sogou-cdn.com and launch the malware through DLL sideloading, a trick in which a trusted program is made to load a harmful helper file in place of a genuine one. The pair consisted of biz_helper.exe, a legitimate Adobe executable, and a rogue libcef.dll containing DarkVigil. Once running, DarkVigil is notable for using the Duplex Message Transport Protocol (DMTP) for its command-and-control (C2) channel, the link an implant uses to take orders from its operators. Through that channel, the client can execute and orchestrate plugins received from the attacker-controlled server to set up persistence, a lasting foothold on the machine, or to collect data. Following responsible disclosure, Tencent fixed the underlying weakness, tracked as CVE-2026-120422, in version 16.10, released on October 29, 2026, by migrating the affected HTTP requests to HTTPS, the encrypted form of web traffic that makes this kind of redirection far harder to carry off.
ESET describes SlippyNunchucks as a nation-state surveillance effort suspected of operating with the interests of the Chinese government in mind. Although the group targets organizations and individuals across multiple sectors, the researchers found significant surveillance activity against one organization operating Chinese-language online betting platforms in Sri Lanka, Hong Kong and the Philippines. That targeting is notable, ESET notes, given China's restrictions on gambling, which include criminal penalties for operating gambling businesses and for organizing Chinese citizens to gamble abroad.
This is not the first time China-nexus actors have weaponized Sogou's typing software as an entry point. In September 2026, Gen Digital reported that a now-patched vulnerability in the input method editor, CVE-2026-51990, was exploited by a group it tracks as UNC3569 to deliver a backdoor dubbed GRAYRABBIT by means of a crafted link. According to Gen Digital, the flaw chains three separate weaknesses into a single one-click exploit: unvalidated command-line argument injection in the sgbiz: custom protocol handler, the mechanism Windows uses to open the app from a link; unrestricted URL navigation in a CEF-based WebView, an embedded browser window; and a severely outdated, unsandboxed Chromium browser engine that is susceptible to CVE-2021-38003.
For readers who type Chinese on Windows, the practical takeaway is direct: the fix exists only in Sogou Input Method version 16.10, so anything older still fetches its configuration over plain HTTP. IT teams supporting Chinese-speaking staff can also check outbound logs for the two staging addresses named above. And since this chain began with a tampered DNS answer, readers may want to look at AEU DNS, which offers private, secure DNS for everyone. The Sogou case shows how a single unencrypted lookup inside a trusted app can become the hinge of a surveillance operation, and how a vendor's move to HTTPS closes that particular door.